While an initial increase of coverage usually follows a coup d'état or revolution, interest tends to dwindle thereafter, proportionate to the decrease of any Communist influence. Again, according to Gans: "Left-wing coups d'état and revolutions often receive more attention than their right-wing equivalents, even when Russia or china is not involved, unless there is widespread killing of civilians or torture of political prisoners. The Cuban revolution was a major foreign story even before the United States and Russia nearly went to war..." 2 . Since the Communist issue did not, however, dominate the new until the latter stages of the war trials period, the attention focused upon Cuba during this period can only be described as unprecedented, especially in view of the light news coverage that followed Fulgencio Batista's right-wing coup in 1952. "U.S. News & World Report", for example, did not contain a single article on Cuba in 1952. But as soon as Fidel Castro began executing war criminals in January 1959, banner headlines, many denouncing the executions as a "bloodbath", appeared with continued frequency throughout the United States. At the same time, most Cubans were hurt and infuriated by the American response. A bitter Castro noted that the United States performed a major role in the war crime trials of German and Japanese leaders at the end of World War II; and even after the International Military Tribunal "completed its task of punishing top Axis leaders, the United States, and the United States alone, insisted upon further tribunals -twelve in all -to prosecute lesser officials accused of "crimes against peace". Since the United States strongly supported the war trials at the end of World War II, U. S. condemation of Cuba's war trials came as a shock to most Cubans. Even "La Quincena", a Cuban Catholic publication, backed the execution of war criminals. Still, the U.S. press continued to denounce the executions until their completion in May 1959.
Just how reliable were U.S. press accounts concerning the Cuban execution of war criminals? Why did such a fundamental difference of opinion exist between the American press and virtually every sector of Cuban society regarding the fairness of the trials? This study will answer these important questions: questions that had great interest for American readers. This study also offers a fresh approach to understanding the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro, its controversial leader, by examining U.S. press coverage of the Cuban war trials which took place throughout Cuba during the first five months of the revolution. By doing so, we may not only achieve a better understanding of U.S.-Cuba relations but also understand our own susceptibilities to the news and its influence on society as a whole.
The periodicals chosen in this study represent a broad political spectrum with circulations ranging from the "Nation's" 26,601 to "Time's" mammoth 2,282,307 (see table 1 for circulation information). During the war trials period, "Time" -founded by the outspoken Henry R. Luce in 1923 -and "U.S. News & World Report" -founded by David Lawrence in 1947 -represented the conservative view and exhibited a strong anti-Castro bias. The pro-Castro "Nation" and "New Republic", with combined weekly subscriptions of 58,101 only, represented the liberal perspective. Since "Newsweek" initially failed to demonstrate either a strong anti or pro Castro bias, it was chosen as the moderate representative. The "New York Times", the only daily chosen, presented a variety of divergent viewpoints. These included the pro-Castro articles of Herbert L. Matthews, the "Times' " editorial chief, and the apprehensive to critical articles by Ruby H. Philips, the paper's resident Cuban correspondent.
In the United States, Castro's victory had caught the press by surprise. As "Newsweek" observed, "The Castro triumph had been a long time coming -and yet when it came, it had come with stunning swiftness" 3 . In fact, just the day before Batista's resignation, Associated Press embarrassingly put out a report asserting that Batista's forces had routed rebel guerrillas at Santa Clara. Significantly, AP's less than accurate coverage of the Cuban situation pervaded U.S. news coverage. As late as its January 5 issue "Time" reported, "In the face of the new threat by the rebels, Batista's regime showed few signs of cracking" 4 . At the same time, neither "Nation", "New Republic" nor "U.S. News & World Report" contained a single article on the insurrection in Cuba. Only "Newsweek" remotely grasped the seriousness of the situation. "Some observers", it noted, "gave Cuba's long omnipotent dictator [Batista] about twenty more days, predicted [sic] a military junta would then take control" s .
More amazingly, few poeple in the United States knew much about Fidel Castro, the bearded hero who had captivated the imagination of millions of Cubans. Who was this man? Why were Americans so unaware of such an important figure, and in a country only 131.1 miles off the Florida coast? Apparently, outside of the gambling casinos and prostitutes, Cuba generated little interest in the United States. In the stereotyped eyes of many North Americans, Cubans were nothing more than hotblooded Latins. According to Florida International University's Latin American expert, Anthony P. M a i η g o t, "Prior to the Cuban Revolution in 1959, few scholars in the U.S. considered Cuba a subject important enough for scholarship" 6 . In his study covering the last four weeks of the insurrection, Howard L. Lewis, a reporter and West Virginia University journalist graduate, found that the Cuban situation "did not, at least on page one, compete against any other major story concerning Latin America" 7 . L ew i s' findings are supported by Harold Flender's observation of the Cuban situation in 1958. According to Flender, an American television writer: "American tourists in Habana show no particular interest in the civil war. They are in Habana to have a good time. The fact that they are sometimes frisked when they go to the Tropicana or to a.baseball game or movie is considered a lark. The fact that a woman had her arm torn off when a bomb exploded in the ladies' room of the Tropicana doesn't faze them one bit. As one American puts it: 'She was a Cuban, anyway. They wouldn't dare start up with us tourists' " 8 . John T. O ' R o u r k e, the "Washington Daily News" editor, recalled a few months after the rebel victory that his paper refused to carry stories about Cuba because no reader interest existed. Actually, O'Rourke's remark on reader interest can be attributed, at least in part, to his country's rather provincial perception of Latin America. After all, how could stories about Cuba, a Latin American country with an alien culture, compete with stories relevant to most Americans: stories about major elections, the Berlin crisis, racial violence, the Cold War and Brigitte Bardot? Neither did Cuba generate much interest among the United States' most popular and "responsible" weeklies: 'Time", "U.S. News & World Report" and "Newsweek". During the entire seven year insurrection, 'Time" carried 70 articles or about 65 columns on Cuba compared to 54 articles or about 67 columns in 1959. If we divide the total number of articles and columns by seven years, the length of insurrection, "Time" averaged 10 articles or 9.3 columns a year on Cuba during the insurrection. "Time's" coverage in 1959, in other words, increased 540 percent in the number of articles and 721 percent in the number of columns. "Newsweek's" coverage during the same period increased 629 percent in the number of articles and a dramatic 1075 percent in the number of columns. "U.S. News & World Report", however, easily outdistanced both "Time" and "Newsweek" with an increase of 3509 percent in the number of articles and an stounding 5430 percent in the number of columns.
Nor were those responsible for shaping U.S. public opinion (i.e., the mass media, State Department and White House) pleased with Castro's victory, despite opinions to the contrary. In a 1960 interview with "U.S: News & World Report" an American official, for example, proclaimed that the press' early pro-Castro sympathies allowed Castro to promote a Communist revolution in Cuba. He believed, "If the State Department, at the beginning, had said, in effect, 'We won't have anything to do with this Castro', we would have been castigated [by the press] and the State Department could never have stood up under the fire" 9 .
9) U.S. News & World Report, July 4, 1960, p. 47 . The myth that the U.S. initially welcomed Castro still persists today, a tribute to the influence of some early writers of the revolution. See, for example, Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York, 1962) . Draper essentially argues that the U.S. welcomed Castro until he betrayed the middle class revolution promised in earlier pronouncements. According to Draper, "The point of no return in Cuba passed in the fall of 1959, long before any overt American action was taken against the Castro regime"; Ibid., 65. Also see Nathaniel W e y 1, Red Star Over Cuba (New York, 1960) . W e y 1, another early writer, lambasted the State Department and press for initially being too soft on Castro.
Yet from the outset the press expressed a great deal of skepticism about Fidel Castro, and his July 26 Movement. According to "Newsweek's" first issue on the revolution, "official Washington saw much to make it apprehensive -for the makeup of Castro's revolutionary forces offered little reassurance". It added, "The movement, politically, runs the gamut from the extreme -and corrupt -right to the flagrant -and unprincipled -left" 10 . "Time" went even further. It had already concluded that Fidel Castro had a "capricious temper" because he called a "pointless general strike"
11 . Yet Earl Ε. T. Smith, the pro-Batista U.S. ambassador to Cuba, regarded the strike as an important factor in rallying support behind the revolutionary forces during the critical hours after Batista's resignation on January 1, 1959 12 . In traditional Lucean style, the magazine also characterized Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a leading rebel commander, as "ruthless" and "Red-loving" 13 . It, moreover, insisted that Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother, "matched Batista terror for terror" 14 . In recent years, Henry Luce's "Time" magazine has been the subject of many studies. In his study, W. A. Swanberg offered these insights: "Time's readability, its occasional insights and its guarantee of entertainment on almost every page had made it something near a national habit, or addiction. It could on occasion make even a radicad stand up and cheer with a devastating portrayal of a reactionary or small-minded politican. . . It never failed to pass on the latest and best wise cracks". He went on to sayi "Jt was this skill in technique, this air of excitement, this entertainment, this 'instruction', this occasionally demonstrated capacity for fairness, that brought in the millions of customers who tripped and fell painlessly into the propagandist net" 18 . 16 . In contrast to the mainstream publications, the left of center periodicals -"Nation" and "New Republic" -acknowledged that previous State Department policies favorable to Batista would lead to uneasy relations with the new Cuban revolutionary government. "For some months now", worte Carleton Beals, the "Nation's" astute Latin American correspondent, "the State Department knew that Batista was doomed, but apparently it did not relish Castro and the July 26 Movement as his successor" 17 . "New Republic" noted that Ambassador Smith's "public antiCastro utterances were so intemperate that he wrote off in advance all thought of friendly US relations with a Castro regime" 18 .
During the revolution's first week a number of executions (some without trials) occurred throughout Cuba, though mostly in war-torn Las Villas and Oriente provinces. These executions, however, only involved notorious killers, informers and torturers. Alba Moya and Sergeant la Rosa, agents of Batista's secret police, the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar, for example, died before rebel firing squads after being tried summarily 19 . Batista's intelligence commander at the Cienfuegos naval district, Captain Alejandro García Olayón, also tried summarily, had ordered scores of civilians tortured after the unsuccessful rebel revolt there in September 1957. For the most part, however, executions during the first week passed unnoticed in the U.S. press. The "New York Times" only made an occasional reference to them, and at no time did they receive headline attention. During the same period, none of the major weeklies, i.e., "Time" (January 12, 1959), "Newsweek" (January 12, 1959) and "U.S. News & World Report" (January 9, 1959), focused upon the executions, concentrating instead on other aspects of the revolution. But as the executions increased in the days following Castro's January 8 arrival in Havana, press accounts from the United States expressed growing concern over the possibility of a bloodbath. With its sensationalist headline of "Jubilation Sc Revenge", "Time" included a pictorial account of former Police Chief Cornelio Rojas' execution, after a rebel tribunali had found him guilty of numerous war crimes 20 . Not content with pictures alone, Time also included a number of captions sarcastically alluding to the alleged lack of procedural guarantees during the trials. The "New York Times", on the other hand, noted the execution of Cornelio Rojas, as well as that of Joaquin Casillo Lumpuy, also guilty of countless war crimes, without the pictorial grandstanding characteristic of "Time". Incidentally, William L. Rivers' fascinating study of the Washington press corps in 1962 reveals that 87.5 percent of the 257 correspondents questioned used the "New York Times" in their work, while 33.5 percent used "Time". Interestingly, the "New York Times" also ranked first in reliability with a 90.7 percent rating 21 . The news weeklies, on the other hand, received poor marks for reliability. In fact, Rivers found: "Not only did 24.1 per cent of the correspondents fail to list any news magazine, but 16.9 per cent wrote 'None' and some of them decorated the margins of the questionnaire with such comments as 'Are you kidding?' and 'No such animal'. "Newsweek", with 75 votes, led the list. It was followed by "U.S. News & World Report", with 66. "Time", which had been first on the 'relied upon' list, received only nine votes for fairness and reliability" 22 .
Commenting on the executions in a taped interview for "Face the Nation", aired on January 11, three days after his arrival in Havana, Castro insisted that the executions had not exceeded "two or three dozen" at that time. Distinguishing the rebels from their counterparts, the Batistianos, Fidel commented, "During the war, we captured thousands of prisoners, and we never killed anyone, never tortured anyone" 23 . Despite the rebel leader's assurances, much of the press nonetheless remained unconvinced. Concerning the trials and executions, Jack Gould of the "New York Times" expressed a familiar American criticism. He felt, "In explaining the execution of supporters of former President Fulgencio Batista, however, Señor Castro was not entirely persuassive regarding his understanding of the right of open trial" 24 . But as the veteran correspondent Richard Dudman observed, "In the context of normal Cuban 'Revolutionary justice', the major defendants were lucky to have any trial at all, considering their important roles in a police state that practiced torture, mutilation and reprisal killings" 25 . Indeed, accustomed to taking justice into their own hands in pre-revolutionary days, Cubans actually demonstrated remarkable restraint. After President Gerado Machado's resignation in 1933, Cuba's Liberal and Conservative parties disintegrated into numerous splinter groups, none of which had the power to dominate the political scene. This led to a long period of political instability, marked by an increase in kidnappings, assassinations and gangsterism. In other words, one can only appreciate the remarkable restraint displayed by most Cubans in the context of Cuban history, a history few Americans knew of, never mind understood.
On January 12, unconfirmed and contradictory reports about a mass execution at Santiago de Cuba reached the American press. Although AP placed the number of executions at seventyfive, other publications and news agencies gave a different version. Since Cuban authorities had banned all foreign journalists from the scene, confusion about the incident ensued. According to eyewitnesses quoted by AP, "the condemned men were shot in two groups, one of fourteen persons, and one of sixty-one" 26 . Yet another eyewitness, a photographer, reported only seeing fourteen executions 27 . One of those executed, Lieutenant Enrique Despaigne, guilty of more than a dozen war crimes, directed his own execution in front of Cuban television cameras by giving the order to fire. The next day a full and detailed account of Despaigne's execution, as well as that of three others, appeared in "Revolución", the July 26 Movement's news organ. But rebel authorities denied the execution of seventy-five at Santiago. Raúl Castro, however, later admitted to the "New York Times'" Herbert Matthews that he had "about seventy" executed, but defended his actions by insisting: "They were sadists, murderers, thieves. We did give them trials, but after the first four had been tried by a due, rather slow process, word came through that difficulties were occurring in the Havana negotiations [with the Directorio Revolucionario, a rival anti-Batista group]. So I speeded up the trials; everyone quickly, and we went on without stopping through the night. Twenty-five men were acquitted. The rest were executed and buried quickly". Raúl added: "I have no regrets, and we have nothing at all to be ashamed of for our Revolution. I was accused of being a murderer, but this was necessary; it was justice. Much worse executions have taken place elsewhere without such a clamor. There had been a stream of widows, fathers, mothers coming to us demanding justice. Frank Pais' parents came to see us and were at the trials. bearing on Raúl's decision to speed up the trials. Since a clash with the Directorio appeared imminent, Raúl made a split-second decision in the event his services would be required to preserve revolutionary unity. Batista had, after all, used the divide and conquer strategy quite successfully during the 1930's. Moreover, careful planning and consideration went into the decision to punish the war criminals. Months before Batista's resignation the underground had been gathering evidence to compile lists of suspected war criminals to be tried upon the revolution's triumph. A Cienfuegos cane planter, for example, told an American reporter that lists of war criminals had appeared in villages throughout his area weeks before Batista's resignation 29 . To simplify matters, the bulk of those accused of war crimes consisted of military personnel who made no secret of their activities. In fact, many officers proudly displayed pictures of their victims at various military functions. Others, like Lieutenant Julio Laurent, just boasted about them. According to one eyewitness, Antonio Santacruz: "On the morning of February 2, 1957, while in Pilon, I went ashore to relax a little along the outskirts of the village, and I found a half burnt bohio and the inside was plainly visible. There were four bodies inside, three adults (two females and a male) multilated beyond recognition and in a crude crib a child about 3 or 4 years old with a bayonet pinning it down through the stomach. These murders had been performed the night before by Lieutenant Laurent upon learning that the guajiro had expressed himself in favor of Castro in one of the local bars. Later that day Laurent weis aboard a ship and confessed in order to impress all of us that he had personally ordered and participated in the murders" 30 .
Despite much of the press' criticism regarding the lack of procedural guarantees involved in the trials, rebel authorities permit- calm down". Obviously associating procedural guarantees with justice, Senator Morse chastised Cuban leaders by insisting, "Executions of Batista leaders and followers should be based at least upon public trials at which evidence can be presented and law and order can prevail". Indeed, according to Senator Morse, "Vengeance seems to be the order of the day in Cuba". Based upon his information, Morse concluded, "It is the old police state tactic of killing those who disagree" 32 . Senator Morse's denunciation, coming from a well known liberal, naturally became front page news, receiving much ink in the press. By January 15, Senator Morse had gained legions of followers -with the notable exceptions of Representatives Charles O. Porter and Adam C. Powell -all denouncing the "bloodbath" taking place in Cuba. Representative Emanuel Celler of New York declared, "We did not send Gen. Leonard Wood and 'Teddy' Roosevelt to rescue Cuba from Spanish oppression in 1898, only to have that unhappy country now plunged into a blood bath" 33 . Another early outspoken anti-Castro representative from New York, Victor L. Anfuso, a member of the House Committee on Agriculture, proclaimed, "Castro is no better than Batista" 34 . He then issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the Cuban government: "Mr. Speaker, I wish to serve notice that unless a democratic form of government is soon established in Cuba and free institutions are allowed to flourish there, I shall be the first to move before the House Committee on Agriculture, of which I am a member, and before the Congress of the United States to drastically reduce the sugar quota for Cuba. Perhaps Castro will be able to understand that kind of language better, since appeals based on Justice and morality do not seem to have the desired effect on 32 ) U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Morse denounces Cuban executions as a "bloodbath", 86th Congress, 1st sess. (January 12, 1959 
him"
35 . Ohio's Wayne Hays, Congress' most outspoken antiCastro critic, requested that Congress send to Castro a message warning him about the possible consequences of continuing the trial and execution of war criminals without observing proper procedural guarantees. Unless Castro complied with the message, Hays suggested Congress restrict tourism or impose an embargo on Cuba. Invariably, Congress' cries for "law and order" conjured up visions of sending the marines to Cuba. In short, Congress began threatening Cuba's revolutionary government barely two weeks after Batista's resignation on January 1, long before Castro's move to socialism.
Even though Congress proved to be more critical of the war trials than did the press, it could not have conveyed its hostility to the public without access to the mass media. The press thus provided Congress with the necessary mouthpiece with which to denounce publicly the "bloodbath" in Cuba. In many respects the press acted naturally. Each nation's press, whether it be in England, West Germany, Russia or the United States, tends to perpetuate the status quo. For example, many statements by important government officials are immediately considered newsworthy, while little attention is given to dissidents or unknowns. Gans explains: "In American news, as in the news of all modern nations, the people who appear most frequently in the news are Knowns, and, for the most part, those in official positions . . during the time of my study, they took up between 70 and 85 percent of all domestic news, while Unknowns occupied about a fifth of the available time or space. The remainder was given over to animals, objects (such as boats or hurricanes), and abstractions (such as inflation)" 36 . By reporting the views of important government officials, responsible or not, the press kept Cuba in the news on a daily basis until the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962, a feat that country never achieved before 1959. "Time" especially, with its enormous circulation and popularity, proved to be an invaluable Congressional ally. Not one to miss an opportunity to grandstand, "Time" frequently carried visual accounts of executions with the "appropriate" captions mocking them. Projecting Fidel Castro as an irrational, bloodthirsty tyrant, "Time" ran the headline, 'The Vengeful Visionary", to describe the Cuban hero in its January 26 issue; and below Castro's picture appeared the caption, "I am determined to show no mercy", a sentence taken out of context 37 . Castro actually promised the thousands of Cubans demanding justice that he was 'determined to show no mercy' to the guilty war criminals. Of the major news weeklies, only "U.S. News & World Report" followed "Time's" example of carrying visual accounts of executions on a regular basis.
On the one hand, "U.S. News &c World Report" appeared to take a softer stand than 'Time". '"Trials"', according to the probusiness magazine, "were being held, but they were mostly of a summary nature and seemingly just for the record". As for the alleged bloodbath taking place in Cuba, it reported: "American diplomats, however, discounted the possibility that large groups of innocent persons were being put to death. 'For a long time the rebels have known everyone connected with the Batista regime', said one U.S. official. The chivatos -informers -are well known. These are the people who are being rounded up, along with the police and the Batista army people'.
38 " But in the same issue (January 23), on the other hand, David Lawrence, the magazine's founder, vehemently denounced the war trials, and he urged the Eisenhower Administration to take measures indicating "our disfavor". 'Today", Lawrence reflected, "millions of people in the United States wish that recognition had not been extended so precipitately". He then suggested that the White House delay "sending an ambassador until it is plainly evident that the new government is capable of discharging international obligations". In fact, President Eisenhower did just that, namely, to delay Ambassador Philip Bonsai's appointment to Cuba. In closing, Lawrence asserted, "a government that violates the traditions 37) Time, January 26, 1959, p. 41. 38) U.S. News & World Report, January 23, 1959, p. 54. of human freedom -by failing even to give a trial to those accused of crime -is not stable enough to warrant the belief that it can protect the lives and property of American citizens" 39 . Not everyone, however, expressed horror or indignation over the trial and execution of war criminals, though such views tended to be in the minority. Under the circumstances, "Newsweek" -the only major mainstream weekly which failed initially to condemn the war trials -demonstrated excellent insight when it noted: "Over the years, Batista's bully boys had tortured and murdered thousands of Cuban men, women, and children. To forestall a popular massacre of the criminals, Castro was giving quick military trials to the worst offenders and shooting those who were found guilty -so far about 200" 40 . Reporting from Havana, the "Nation's" Carleton Beals also came to the rebels' immediate defense. Contradicting both Senator Morse and David Lawrence's assertion that rebel firing squads had executed prisoners without trials, Beals claimed: "It is impossible to check all cases, but so far as I have been able to ascertain, the number of such persons executed without trials has not been large and occurred during the first few days after Batista fled. Some militiamen have been jailed for shooting prisoners. In all other cases, even in the stress of battle conditions, prisoners have been given a trial with a defense attorney, have been confronted with with->>41 nesses .
While Congress continued to denounce Cuba's war trials, rebel authorities started exhuming bodies which had often laid in mass graves, where Batista's cohorts had left them. From one end of the island to the other, bodies -many of which showed signs of sadistic torture -were unearthed, exposing the horror of the former regime. On January 13, rebel officials reported finding 80 bodies at a site near Yara and 105 at a site in Manzanillo, each located in Oriente province. At a garage adjacent to a Havana police station, rebels discovered human bones as well as electrical a good deal of publicity in the American press. "Time" called it an "irresponsible crowd pleaser". It added, "Although the U.S. had done nothing more than recognize his [Castro's] regime swiftly, he denounced 'cannon diplomacy'. . ,"
47 . Yet "Time" omitted telling readers about the State Department's concerted effort to stop Castro from coming to power by trying to replace the Batista regime with a caretaker government, a fact the "Nation's" readers knew about from the outset of the revolution. "Time", moreover, dismissed Cuba's criticm that the U.S. press remained silent about Batista's atrocities by telling readers, "reporters trying to run down atrocity stories often found them to be rumors or plants" 48 . The Lucepress also assured readers, "Batista had streaks of mercy: most of today's rebel leaders, including the Castros, once jailed, were freed by Batista and lived to fight him again" 49 . Here "Time" confuses mercy with pragmatism. The reason Batista freed the two Castros in 1955 stemmed from the need to gain American public support for his increasingly discredited regime, thereby assuring him of the needed weapons to maintain control over the island. Carleton Beals, for one, refuted "Time's" suggestion that rebel authorities fabricated atrocity stories. He wrote: "The story is almost too gruesome to be told. I have looked at the torture instruments in police stations and barracks; I have seen the mangled bodies of unknown persons being dug up in barracks and the pitiful queues of weeping relatives hoping to identify a loved one who has vanished. I have seen deposits of human fingernails and toenails, yanked out of live victims, and human eyes that were gouged out. It is almost a Buchenwald story, the crimes committed by this clever little dictator so pampered by our State Department in both Democratic and Republican days" 50 .
Meanwhile, revelations linking U.S. authorities with Batista's repression continued to appear in the Cuban press. The open displays of friendship towards the Batista regime extended far beyond most U.S. press accounts. Four U.S. Embassy officials, for example, belonged as honorary members to the despised Servicio de Inteligencia Militar. Nor was American involvement with Batista's secret police confined to the U.S. Embassy. According to Hugh Τ h o m as, the secret police "had special relations with the F.B.I."
51 . More embarrassing, a rebel spokesperson revealed that Nicaragua had sold Batista weapons manufactured in the United States, ranging from handguns to napalm, used illegally against the Cuban rebels, that is, not in compliance with the treaty limiting such weapons to hemispheric defense only. These revelations fueled Cuban hostilities towards American criticism of the war trials. For the most part, however, the "responsible" press carefully avoided publishing Cuban revelations embarrassing to the United States. Neither "Time", "Newsweek" nor "U.S. News & World Report" published material involving the State Department's effort to stop Castro from coming to power, though "Nation" and "New Republic", non-mainstream publications, had informed its readers of such efforts. The U.S. Embassy's links with Batista's secret police also failed to.surface in the "responsible" press' coverage of the Cuban situation. To its credit, the "New York Times" -perhaps because of Herbert Matthews' pro-Castro sympathies -at least reported rebel allegations that the United States sent arms, including napalm, through Nicaragua. But these kind of allegations were not widely reported in the U.S. press. This sort of selectivity kept Americans in the dark about conditions in Cuba before the revolution.
What infuriated Cubans most, however, was the Justice Department's refusal to return Rolando Masferrer, Esteban Ventura and other accused war criminals to stand trial in Cuba. When Batista made similar requests the U.S. government, so it seemed to many Cubans, complied promptly. Did not the United States return Sergeant Luis Miranda to Cuba to stand trial as a deserter upon Batista's request? Sergeant Miranda served in Batista's navy until he joined the rebels during the Cienfuegos naval revolt on September 5, 1957. After Batista's armed forces crushed the re-volt, Luis went into hiding for three months before being smuggled aboard the "Bahia de Nipe", a frigate, on December 14. Before arriving in New York, the ship's port of destination, Batista authorities discovered and arrested him as a deserter. His brother Mario, a U.S. citizen living in Chicago, pleaded with American authorities to grant Luis political asylum. American authorities, however, immediately rejected Mario's plea to grant Luis political asylum. The blatant pro-Batista decision caused a number of angry Cuban exiles to storm the "Bahia de Nipe" in New York harbour in order to free the Cuban refugee, but the attempt failed to do so. According to the "New York Times", Luis then desparately /'slashed his upper left arm thirty-two times with a razor blade" 52 . U.S. officials nevertheless bowed to Batista, returning Luis to Cuba to face certain imprisonment and possible death.
If the United States could hand over Luis Miranda, a political refugee, to Batista, then surely it would return the likes of Masferrer and Ventura to the rebel government. Would it not? In fact, the U.S. government's refusal to return accused war criminals proved to be a major turning point in U.S.-Cuba relations, for these were not ordinary refugees but known killers, rapists and thieves. Castro told Lee Lockwood, an American journalist, "The conflicts between all that the Revolution stands for and everything the United States stands for became clear immediately when they gave asylum to the worst criminals, individuals who had murdered hundreds of Cuban people" 53 . Juxtaposed to the Batista regime, U.S. policy inconsistencies towards the Cuban revolutionary government convinced Castro that American authorities, with the aid of the press, were conspiring against the revolution. "That process", Fidel explained, "completed my political education" 54 . 
54) Ibid.
On May 15, 1959, Cuban authorities suspended the tribunals, thus ending the war crime trials period. In the end some 550 Cubans, mostly military personnel, were executed for war crimes during the first five months of the revolution. This figure may not include the 70 Raul Castro had executed at Santiago de Cuba, which would raise the total to 620. Since "Revolución" recorded the executions quite openly, the 620 figure would appear to be accurate. Word of Cuba's decision to suspend the tribunals surprisingly received little press attention. "Time", for example, did not even comment on the decision; others responded condescendingly. "Newsweek", so understanding at the outset, voiced its disgust with Castro and the war trials. "At long last", it commented, "there were signs that Fidel Castro's blood bath was ending" 55 . By May then the "bloodbath" image of Castro and the executions had taken root among most major mainstream U.S. organs of public opinion.
In the past many scholars of the Cuban revolution have emphasized Castro's move to socialism as the crucial factor that caused the open confrontation between Cuba and the United States. In doing so, they ignore the war trials' impact on U.S.-Cuba relations. The war trials provoked widespread ciriticsm in the United States, so much so that Congress threatened the Cuban revolutionary government only two weeks after Batista took refuge in the Dominican Republic. These threats included reducing Cuba's sugar quota, restricting tourism, imposing an embargo and restoring "law and order" in Cuba. Such threats aroused much anti-American sentiment in Cuba. After days of silence on the United States, Castro responded to Congress' threats by making his first, of many, anti-American speeches. This marked the first confrontation between the United States and revolutionary Cuba: a confrontation that left permanent scars on the young, impressionable rebels. Why did the United States respond to the war trials so critically? From the very outset of the revolution, official representatives of U.S. public opinion, i.e., Congress, the State Department, the White House and the press, expressed much concern about the political makeup of Castro's rebels. This concern manifested itself in U.S. condemnation of the Cuban war trials; not because they actually believed them to be morally wrong, but because the feared the worst: a Communist take over. Instead of attacking Castro directly as a Communist, however, American organs of public opinion clouded the issue by insisting that accused war criminals did not receive trials or sufficient procedural guarantees before being executed by rebel firing squads. This, of course, was not the case. Outside of the first few days after Batista fled the island, rebel authorities provided accused prisoners with certain procedural guarantees: guarantees such as the right to counsel, the right to submit evidence, the right to confront witnesses, etc. Even the Cuban Catholic Church supported the rebels' war trials policy. At the same time, Batista's cohorts brazenly and openly killed, tortured, and raped for their own amusement. They were therefore well known to many Cuban families which had suffered from their brutal behavior.
Yet Congress, led by Senator Morse, immediately denounced the war trials and executions as a "bloodbath", accusing rebels of killing innocent Cubans, Congress' criticism, not surprisingly, received extensive press coverage, appearing on the front page of most major U.S. newspapers. By giving Congressional criticism of the war trials so much attention the press transmitted Congress' hostility to the American people, and some did so more eagerly than others. Henry Luce's "Time" magazine, for example, responded by publishing gory photographs of executions, printing lurid accounts of revolutionary justice and by projecting negative images of Fidel Castro, and his July 26 Movement, through the use of image-laden nouns and adjectives. Luce actually believed almost anything justified the United States winning the cold War, including slanting the news. Castro, in fact, singled out "Time's" Cuban coverage as a deliberate attempt to discredit the revolution. On other occasions, Fidel accused the press of representing "vested interests". Not surprisingly, Castro's allegations received little serious attention in the United States at that time. Gans nonetheless asserts that the American press "tend[s] to follow American foreign policy, even if not slavishly, but they hew closer to the State Department line on foreign news than to the White House line on domestic news" 56 . As for reliability, Gans cautions, "Foreign news adheres less strictly to objectivity than domestic news" 51 . Responding to Anthony Lewis of the "New York Times", Noam Chomsky writes: "The general subservience of the media, as we discuss, results from the interaction of many factors: shared interest, self-censorship, a natural chauvinism, the effects of past indoctrination, careful selection of personnel, class Ioyalities, ownership interest and advertising pressure, etc. The point is that there are significant institutional factors that produce the general pattern of misrepresentation and service to the state propaganda system. . . "
s8 . In other words, the "responsible" press -those in the cultural and ideological mainstream -are least likely, with exceptions, to provide reliable foreign news coverage. This was true especially during the Cold War era when many newspapers and magazines deliberately slanted the news in order to combat the "Red" menace. In his study of the press, James Aronson, a former New York Times correspondent, wrote: "But the Cold War was not an aberration from the norm of United States policy, and McCarthy ism was not an isolated phenomenon. The one was in the .service of the other. Both have been ground into the American consciousness. . ." s9 .
On the whole, Americans received a continual dose of onesided, often inept, reporting on the Cuban war trials. By continually presenting readers with lurid stories and gory photographs of revolutionary justice, "Time" and "U.S. News & World Report" (combined weekly subscriptions of 3,326,056) deceived many Americans into mistaking the unusual for the norm, that is, executions were perceived as a way of life for Cuba's revolutionaries. Furthermore, their failure to print Cuban allegations si ) G a η s. Deciding What's News, p. 37. ") Ibid., p. 38, 58 )Noam Chomsky's reply to Anthony Lewis, Real Paper (Cambridge, Massachusetts), 8 (December 22, 1979): 4. 59 ) James Aronson, The Press and the cold war (Indianapolis, Indiana, 1970), p. 288. against the United States made it appear that Castro's anti-American speeches had no basis in fact. They were viewed as the ramblings of an unstable Latin radical. The liberal press attempted to balance the "responsible" press' Cuban coverage by presenting readers with the rebel side of the story, but their meager circulations made such a task impossible. This study consequently supports the contention that the press, at least those in the ideological and cultural mainstream, tends to follow U.S. foreign policy and cannot be expected to print news contrary to the "national interest". The American press therefore is not entirely free as commonly asserted but subject to ideological and cultural values deemed important to the nation's preservation. These values then determine what is (or is not) news.
